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Abstract: With international migration at a record high, a burgeoning literature has ex-
plored the drivers of public attitudes toward migrants. However, most studies to date have focused
on developed countries, which have relatively fewer migrants and more capacity to absorb them.
We address this sample bias by conducting a survey of public attitudes toward Syrians in Jor-
dan, a developing country with one of the largest shares of refugees. Our analysis indicates that
neither personal nor community-level exposure to the economic impact of the refugee crisis is as-
sociated with anti-migrant sentiments among natives. Further, an embedded conjoint experiment
validated with qualitative evidence demonstrates the relative importance of humanitarian and cul-
tural concerns over economic ones. Taken together, our findings weaken the case for egocentric and
sociotropic economic concerns as critical drivers of anti-migrant attitudes, and demonstrate how
humanitarian motives can sustain support for refugees when host and migrant cultures are similar.
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1 Introduction
Countries across the globe are struggling to cope with the highest levels of forced displacement
recorded since the end of World War II. Pushed out of their countries of origin due to protracted
conflict and poverty, more than 28 million people are currently living as refugees. This increase
in migration has led to social tensions and political conflict in many host societies in recent years.
For example, in Germany, the settlement of nearly one million asylum seekers and refugees since
2015 has sparked violent protest and arson attacks on refugee shelters (Bencek & Strasheim, 2016).
In Austria and Greece, the temporary presence of passing asylum seekers and refugees has fueled
the rise of populist right-wing (Steinmayer, 2018) and even neo-fascist (Dinas et al., 2019) parties.
In the U.K., areas that witnessed an increase in immigration have been more supportive of Brexit
(Becker et al., 2017).
A sizable and fast-growing literature has begun to leverage surveys and natural experiments
to examine when migration leads to conflict, and what factors shape natives’ attitudes toward
migrants. While migration may be forced (i.e. refugees and asylum seekers) or voluntary (i.e. eco-
nomic immigrants), this research indicates that attitudes toward these groups are highly correlated
and share similar foundations (Adida et al., 2019; Bansak et al., 2016; Hangartner et al., 2019).
Earlier studies in this field stressed the importance of individual-level economic self-interest and
labor market competition in shaping anti-migrant sentiment (Mayda, 2006; Scheve & Slaughter,
2001), and some have argued that natives in areas and industries with particularly high levels of
migration may be more concerned about individual-level labor market competition than natives
who are not (Dancygier & Donnelly, 2013; Malholtra et al., 2017). More recently, however, an
emerging consensus has developed that sociotropic concerns related to the economic impact of
migrants on host communities (Adida et al., 2019; Bansak et al., 2016; Hainmueller & Hiscox,
2010; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014, 2015; Valentino et al., 2019) and cultural and religious (i.e.
anti-Muslim) concerns about how migration changes local customs and traditions (Adida et al.,
2019; Bansak et al., 2016; Card et al., 2005; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Hopkins, 2010) are the
main drivers of opposition to migration in Europe and the United States. Recent studies suggest
that humanitarian considerations may also influence attitudes toward refugees specifically, though
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sociotropic and cultural factors remain the key drivers of attitudes toward these groups (Adida et
al., 2019; Bansak et al., 2016).
Our work addresses a limitation in the existing literature. Namely, most of the current evidence
on what drives attitudes toward migrants has emerged from studies focused on developed countries,
especially in Europe and the United States (e.g. Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Valentino et al.,
2019). And yet, in both aggregate and relative terms, it is developing countries that have been most
impacted by the recent wave of migration, which has been driven largely by refugees and asylum
seekers fleeing conflicts in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Globally, developing countries host
85 percent of the world’s 25.4 million refugees and approximately half of the world’s 3.1 million
asylum seekers. The Middle East and Africa alone host 46 percent of these refugees (UNHCR, 2018).
However, we have little evidence for how populations in these countries react to large inflows of
migrants and whether our existing theories apply in these contexts. Figure 1 demonstrates this
geographic mismatch between the empirical distribution of migrants and refugees and the areas that
have been the focus in the academic literature on attitudes toward migrants. For each country, the
figure plots the concentration of migrants and refugees against the number of studies in leading
political science journals on attitudes toward migrants conducted in that country. There is no
apparent relationship between the share of migrants or refugees and the frequency with which a
country has been studied. To the contrary, it is precisely the Middle Eastern countries with the
largest concentration of migrants and refugees that have received almost no attention in the political
science literature on attitudes toward migrants.
We argue that the focus on Western countries in the literature, and the resulting imbalance
between where public attitudes toward migrants are studied and where most migration has been
occurring, is a limitation of existing academic knowledge on this topic. We lack an understanding
of public attitudes toward migration in a range of countries that have been significantly impacted
by migration. In addition, our purportedly general theories about the drivers of attitudes toward
migrants are built from specific country contexts characterized by relatively high economic and
infrastructural capacity to absorb new migrant populations, and relatively high levels of cultural
difference between the migrant and host populations.
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Figure 1: Geographic mismatch between academic literature and concentration of migrants.
Note: Literature count includes studies from the following academic journals between the years
2008 and 2018: APSR, AJPS, JOP, CPS, BJPS, WP, IO, ISQ, JPR, JCR, PSRM, PNAS.
The potential implications of the differences in host country contexts for our theories of attitudes
toward migrants are substantial. First, the hypothesis that egocentric economic concerns about
labor market competition are a main driver of attitudes toward migrants receives little support
in Western countries, where unemployment is low, welfare states are expansive, and, given the
language gap, most natives have a baseline higher skill set than new arrivals from abroad. We
might expect that this hypothesis could play out very differently in less developed host countries
that typically feature limited economic opportunities, weak welfare states, and a higher proportion
of migrant arrivals who speak the same language as the native population and have similar skill
sets to them.
Second, while sociotropic concerns about the impact of migrants on the economy of host com-
munities are an important driver of attitudes toward migration in developed nations, these concerns
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might be even more prevalent in contexts where immigration further strains typically weak public
services, rudimentary education systems, crowded housing markets, and labor markets character-
ized by high unemployment and general lack of economic opportunities.
Third, several studies (Bansak et al., 2016; Kalkan et al., 2009; Sides & Gross, 2009) have shown
that cultural concerns related to religion, and in particular anti-Muslim bias, are an important
determinant of attitudes toward migrants. Given that this concern will not always be shared by
the predominantly Muslim societies of the Middle East, where many displaced Muslim refugees
have settled in recent years, we might expect that cultural concerns would be less impactful in
shaping individuals’ attitudes toward migrants than in Western countries.
Despite the importance of less developed countries as test cases for our theories of the drivers of
attitude formation toward migrants, limited research has been conducted on this topic in developing
contexts to date. To be sure, there exist several insightful qualitative studies about local responses
to migration in developing countries (e.g. Adepoju, 2003; Bariagaber, 2006; Frontani et al., 2009;
Grabska, 2006; Levitan et al., 2009; Lie, 2019; Martin, 2005; Norman, 2019, 2016; Onoma, 2013),
but this literature is not intended to provide a representative survey of mass public opinion or
experimental tests of particular drivers of attitudes toward migrants. Researchers interested in
testing these questions outside of the Western context face practical challenges to conducting large-
scale public opinion research in countries where existing survey data or quality sampling frames
are often not readily available. In recent years, a handful of scholars have sought to overcome
these barriers by conducting quantitative research that addresses attitudes toward migration in
developing countries (e.g. Adida, 2011; Buehler & Han, 2019; Ghosn et al., 2018; Hartman &
Morse, 2018; Zhao, 2018). Although the findings and geographic reach of these studies have been
important for expanding our understanding of this issue outside of Western countries, these studies
are generally designed to evaluate specific arguments rather than arbitrate between competing
theories regarding the factors that shape host populations’ attitudes toward migrant communities.
We begin to address these limitations in the literature by conducting a survey of public atti-
tudes toward migration in Jordan, one of the countries most affected by the Syrian refugee crisis
that began in 2011. With its weak economy, high rates of unemployment, predominantly Mus-
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lim population, and shared language and overlapping skill set between many Syrian refugees and
Jordanian natives, Jordan represents a suitable test case for the generalizability and limitations
of theories of attitude formation toward migrants. Using the random walk technique in randomly
sampled districts, we fielded a representative survey of 1,500 Jordanians in regions with both high
and low concentrations of Syrian refugees. The survey included a combination of observational and
experimental research designs. The survey measured attitudes about the perceived impact of Syrian
refugees on the country, hostility toward the refugee population, and support for anti-refugee poli-
cies, as well as respondent characteristics that have been identified as potential drivers of attitudes
toward migrants in other contexts. This data allows us to test which respondent characteristics are
important predictors of attitudes toward Syrian refugees. In addition to this observational design,
the survey also leveraged a conjoint experiment that asked respondents to choose between random-
ized profiles of refugees with different attributes, allowing us to test for the relative importance of
economic, cultural, and humanitarian considerations in shaping attitudes toward migrants.
In contrast to our theoretical predictions, we find little support for the idea that economic
concerns are an important driver of Jordanians’ attitudes toward Syrian refugees. Instead, we
find evidence that humanitarian and cultural factors have had the most effect on how individual
Jordanians perceive the refugee population. Jordanians who have been more economically impacted
by the crisis, either personally or in their communities, are no more likely to hold negative attitudes
than their counterparts, while Jordanians who are more exposed to refugees’ challenging living
conditions and who are less sensitive to cultural threat demonstrate more positive attitudes toward
refugees. In addition, the conjoint experiment demonstrates that both humanitarian vulnerability
and cultural similarity outweigh egocentric and sociotropic economic concerns in determining which
Syrian refugees Jordanians prefer to host.
Taken together, these results further undermine egocentric arguments about attitude formation
toward migrants, and call into question an emerging consensus around the importance of sociotropic
economic factors. On the other hand, in line with existing research focused on Europe (Bansak
et al., 2016) and the United States (Newman et al., 2015), our study highlights the potential
for humanitarian concerns to sustain public support for hosting migrants over extended periods of
time, even in challenging economic circumstances. However, our finding that cultural considerations
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strongly influence Jordanians’ willingness to welcome refugees points to a condition on the power of
humanitarian concerns. Specifically, most Syrian refugees in Jordan share cultural similarities with
their hosts. If these similarities were replaced by salient cultural differences, our findings suggest
that Jordanians would be less likely to let humanitarian motives override the perceived economic
costs of hosting so many refugees. As a result, our paper reinforces the consensus on the importance
of cultural factors in shaping attitudes toward migration.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. We first develop a set of theoretical expecta-
tions drawing on the existing literature on attitudes toward migrants, and we then discuss these
expectations in the context of the Syrian refugee crisis and its impact on Jordan. Next, we describe
our research design, followed by a presentation of our results. We conclude with a discussion of
the implications of our findings for the broader literature, as well as practical recommendations for
policymakers.
2 Attitudes Toward Migrant Populations
The almost exclusive focus on developed countries in the existing literature has made it difficult
to assess the strength of empirical support for, and the generalizability of, the four main drivers of
attitudes toward migrant populations postulated in existing research.
The first main debate among scholars studying attitudes toward migration revolves around the
labor market competition hypothesis. This hypothesis postulates that natives who have a similar
skill set as arriving migrants fear that competition for jobs leads to a higher risk of being replaced in
the labor force or experiencing downward pressure on wages (Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Dustmann &
Preston, 2007; Malholtra et al., 2013; Mayda, 2006; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001). As a consequence,
these natives are particularly opposed to incoming migration. While some studies find support
for the labor market competition hypothesis when focusing on native workers in industries most
exposed to migration (e.g. Dancygier & Donnelly, 2013; Malholtra et al., 2017; but see Hainmueller
et al., 2015), a survey of the literature reveals that for the general public in Europe and the United
States, support for egocentric economic concerns revolving around labor market competition is, at
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best, limited (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). This result is consistent with the limited impacts
of immigration on natives wages in these contexts found in much of the empirical literature (e.g.
Dustmann et al., 2012; Foged & Peri, 2016).
However, this finding of scarce evidence for the labor market competition hypothesis might
only hold in the developed contexts studied so far. Developing countries not only host a larger
fraction of the world’s displaced population, but also feature several other characteristics that
make labor market competition between natives and migrants more intense than in developed
countries. Unemployment is higher, wages are lower, welfare support offers limited or even no
protection against the economic and social consequences of job loss, active labor market programs
and retraining opportunities for displaced natives are rare, and the substitutability of migrant and
native workers who speak the same language and have similar skill sets is higher. For all of these
reasons, we might expect egocentric economic concerns about migration to be more prevalent in
developing countries.
The second major theory in the literature posits that sociotropic concerns about the host
country’s economy, welfare system, and public services shape attitudes toward migrants. An extant
literature shows that in the United States and Europe, both high- and low-skilled natives are more
welcoming of migrants that are young, educated, skilled, and motivated, and therefore more likely to
make a greater economic contribution to the host country economy and less likely to strain welfare
systems and public services (Bansak et al., 2016; Citrin et al., 1997; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2015).
Given that developing countries’ economies are weaker, welfare systems are less developed, and
public services are more limited than in developed countries, we might also expect sociotropic
concerns to be more prevalent in the former.
Third, the existing literature offers a solid consensus that attitudes toward migrants are sub-
stantially shaped by perceived cultural threat and concerns that migration will change the host
country’s dominant culture and identity (Campbell et al., 2006; Card et al., 2012; Chandler &
Tsai, 2001; Golder, 2003; Sinderman et al., 2004). A number of studies show that Americans
and Europeans prefer migrants from countries whose cultures are believed to be similar to their
own (Dustman & Preston, 2007; Hainmueller & Hangartner, 2013; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2015).
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Cultural threat also includes religious concerns, and there is a well-documented preference among
European and American natives for migrants whose faith traditions match the host country’s dom-
inant religion (Adida et al., 2019; Bansak et al., 2016; Kalkan et al., 2009; Sides & Gross 2009).
Bansak et al. (2016) show that in traditionally Christian societies, religious concerns are prevalent
in shaping negative attitudes toward Muslim asylum seekers. These cultural preferences are likely
rooted in general dispositions toward in-groups and out-groups that individuals develop early in
life and deviate from only rarely (Kalkan et al., 2009; Tesler, 2015).
Such cultural and religious concerns may play out differently in developing countries, perhaps
even holding less importance overall in determining host community attitudes toward migrant
populations. For instance, Adida (2011) suggests that migrants in West Africa who are culturally
more similar to host communities face a paradox in which their similarity pushes community leaders
to highlight what group differences do exist, thereby increasing barriers to integration compared
to migrants who are more culturally distinct. At the same time, since migrants who settle in
a developing country often originate from geographically proximate places, their origin and host
societies are more likely to share important cultural features. This closeness may decrease concerns
among the host population that migration will significantly impact the dominant culture, relative
to similar concerns in developed countries addressed by most existing literature. In other words,
the smaller cultural distance between refugees and their hosts in most developing countries could
translate into a weaker role for cultural concerns in shaping attitudes toward migrants.
Fourth, Newman et al. (2015) suggest that an individual’s sensitivity to humanitarian concerns
influences their attitudes toward immigration in the United States. Likewise, recent studies includ-
ing Bansak et al. (2016) and Adida et al. (2019) suggest that attitudes toward asylum seekers and
refugees in the United States and Europe are also shaped by humanitarian concerns. For instance,
focusing on fifteen European countries, Bansak et al. (2016) show that public preferences are sen-
sitive to humanitarian concerns about the deservingness and legitimacy of the asylum request, as
well as the severity of the asylum seeker’s vulnerability. In fact, humanitarianism may be particu-
larly salient for attitudes toward refugees, who are legally defined by the need to flee their country
due to war, persecution, or violence. As a result, attitudes in developing countries could be driven
more heavily by humanitarian concerns than attitudes in developed countries, since refugees often
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make up a higher share of the migrant population in these countries. On the other hand, the large
number of refugees in these contexts, combined with the fact that many developing countries have
faced repeated waves of refugee arrivals, suggests that humanitarian concerns could be eroded by
perceptions that refugees constitute a significant burden.
In sum, we might expect egocentric economic concerns about labor market competition and
sociotropic concerns about the host country economy to be stronger, and humanitarian and cultural
concerns to be weaker, in developing countries. However, without additional research in these
contexts designed to test the relative strength of these theories, it is difficult to know how the
factors that underlie attitudes toward migrants compare to those in developed countries. The next
section explains the features that make Jordan a good case to test these expectations.
3 The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Jordan
To address the sample bias in existing studies of attitude formation toward migrant populations,
we focus on the Syrian refugee crisis and its impact on Jordan.
At present, Jordan is one of the world’s major hosting countries of Syrian refugees. The Syrian
conflict has displaced 13 million Syrians, nearly 60 percent of Syria’s pre-conflict population. Nearly
half of this number are displaced inside Syria, while approximately 5 million are living in countries
that border Syria, including Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq. Figure 2 displays the aggregate
numbers of Syrian refugees and their percentage of the total population by host country as of 2017
(Connor, 2018).
As the figure makes clear, the per-capita increase has been particularly significant in Lebanon
and Jordan. In Jordan, registered Syrian refugees now constitute seven percent of the total pop-
ulation, and the total percentage is likely much higher given the government’s estimates of an
additional 600,000 unregistered Syrians residing in the country.1 This influx represents a massive
and rapid increase in Jordan’s population, equivalent to nearly all Canadians moving to the United
1 The government’s number is contested. As a result, we rely primarily on the official number of 660,000 refugees
registered with UNHCR.
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States as refugees in the span of just a few years. Furthermore, the refugee population demonstrates
substantial vulnerabilities: approximately 45 percent are under the age of 15, while approximately
5 percent are above the age of 60. Poverty is widespread, even for families in which at least one
member is employed (Ajluni & Lockhart, 2019).2
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Figure 2: Distribution of Syrian refugees by host country as of 2017
Note: Data in this figure was compiled by the Pew Research Center (Connor, 2018).
Initially, Jordan permitted Syrian refugees to enter the country freely. Many of the earliest
arrivals stayed in the north of the country, where they often shared tribal ties with Jordanians
(Betts et al., 2017). As the number of refugees increased, UNHCR and the Jordanian government
2 The gender balance among refugees is relatively even, with 51 percent female and 49 percent male (Ajlouni &
Lockhart, 2019).
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opened the Zaatari Refugee Camp in July 2012, which quickly became the fourth largest city
in Jordan. Despite government efforts to organize the refugee population, more than 80 percent
of Syrian refugees in Jordan have settled outside Zaatari and the other official camps, choosing
instead to live in urban areas (Francis, 2015). In the first few years of the crisis, these Syrians were
granted access to Jordan’s public services, including free medical care and education. However,
by 2014, policies became noticeably more restrictive as the number of refugees continued to grow.
The government began restricting border crossings with increasing frequency, and shut them down
completely following a terrorist attack in June 2016, leaving tens of thousands of displaced Syrians
stranded on the Syrian side of the border (Black, 2016; Kayyali, 2017). Refugees’ access to free
health care in Jordan was revoked in late 2014, and subsidies for health care and bread were lifted
in 2018 (Khalidi, 2018; Medecins Sans Frontieres, 2018). The government has also relocated many
refugees from urban areas to the camps, while sending some back to Syria (Francis, 2015; Human
Rights Watch 2017).
Despite these more restrictive policies related to entry, return, and certain public services, the
Jordanian government has increasingly taken steps to integrate Syrians into the labor market and
education system. In 2017, the government opened public schools to Syrian children lacking official
documents, and the country’s schools are estimated to serve more than 100,000 refugees (Al-Abed,
2017). Since the start of the crisis, a significant percentage of working-age Syrians have participated
in the economy, often informally in sectors including agriculture, manufacturing, construction, and
services. In 2016, as part of a deal with the EU, the government made it easier for Syrians in
these sectors to obtain work permits and participate in the labor force legally. As of May 2018,
more than 100,000 of these permits had been issued, though uptake was slower than expected and
many Syrians continue to work informally (Lockhart & Dryden, 2018). An August 2017 poll of
registered Syrian refugees estimated their labor force participation rate at 55 percent, indicating
approximately 200,000 Syrians employed or looking for work (Ajluni & Lockhart, 2019). Certain
high-skilled sectors like medicine and accounting remain closed to formal employment of Syrians,
though anecdotal evidence suggests that some do work in these sectors without authorization. For
low-skilled Jordanians, it is even clearer that the country’s persistently weak labor market combined
with the number of Syrians employed or looking for work constitutes a real challenge to their wages
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and employment prospects (Stave & Hillesund, 2015).
The Jordanian government has defended its halting steps toward integration and its more re-
strictive border policies by arguing that public opinion makes it difficult to be too favorable to
refugees (Francis, 2015). While Jordan’s monarchy is an authoritarian regime in which popular
input is limited, the government is often responsive to public opinion and does what it can to avoid
policies that will trigger unrest. Jordanians vote for and interact frequently with their members
of parliament in clientelistic exchanges (Kao, 2015; Lust-Okar, 2006), giving the public direct ac-
cess to influential members of the political elite who often adopt populist stances. Furthermore,
the country has a history of large protests forcing changes to the cabinet and government policies
(Ryan, 2018). As a result, though Jordanian politics generally – and attitudes toward refugees
specifically – are not tied as closely to partisan organizations and ideologies as in many West-
ern countries, government officials have been wary of perceived disgruntlement among Jordanians
about their country’s policy toward refugees. In an interview with the authors, officials from a
Jordanian government ministry explained that the government was reluctant to provide all Syrians
with work permits because of “serious public tension.” They felt that even minor changes to such
policies could arouse the public’s anger and that “the government must be extremely careful about
any decision or policy change” as a result. The officials attributed this sensitivity to the fact that
“Jordan has been bearing a lot of the costs, [with] huge pressures on health and education,” in
addition to a public perception that “priority [for aid opportunities] is being given to Syrians.”
Although these government claims could be interpreted as an effort to increase pressure on the
international community to deliver additional financial assistance to Jordan, there is little doubt
that the impact of refugees on Jordan has been substantial and the potential for conflict with host
communities is high. Prior to the arrival of Syrian refugees, Jordan’s economy was already quite
fragile as a result of water scarcity, aging infrastructure, expensive housing, and inadequate job
opportunities. In addition, the government has long depended on extensive borrowing to sustain
public services and the public sector workforce, which is one of the largest in the world (Malkawi,
2016). These preexisting issues have been exacerbated by the rapid influx of refugees. Between 2011
and 2014, the unemployment rate increased from 14 percent to 22 percent, and from 19 percent to
35 percent for youth aged 15-24. While Jordanians are on average more educated than the Syrian
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refugee population living in Jordan, the ILO estimates that at least some of this increase can
be attributed to Jordanians being pushed out of the labor market by refugees (Stave & Hillesund,
2015). Housing prices increased by as much as 300 percent in 2013, and the health ministry claimed
to be spending half of its annual budget on medical care for Syrians prior to ending free services
(Luck, 2013). The government has estimated the annual cost of the crisis to be in the billions
(Francis, 2015). Though the international community has provided extensive financial assistance
to Jordan, the Jordanian government claims that more assistance is needed to fully cover the costs
associated with the crisis (Husseini, 2018).
Given these circumstances, the Jordanian government’s concern with hostile public opinion to-
ward refugees is unsurprising. Several European countries experienced a significant public backlash
for hosting much smaller refugee populations in both aggregate and per-capita terms, despite hav-
ing significantly greater resources to absorb them. Extensive anecdotal evidence and some polling
data from preceding years suggest that Jordanians have been frustrated with the perceived burdens
associated with the hosting of refugees.3 These frustrations were clear in focus groups conducted
by the authors in January 2017, in which Jordanian participants complained about Syrians stealing
jobs, driving up rents, and decreasing the quality of public education. At the same time, incidents
of violence between Jordanians and Syrian refugees have been relatively rare, and there has been
no political mobilization among the Jordanian public around demands for refugees to be expelled
from the country or restricted to camps.
In short, like many developing countries, Jordan is a case in which (1) the number of refugees and
asylum seekers is substantial as a share of the national population; (2) refugees and asylum seekers in
the country largely share a similar skill set to a portion of the native population; (3) the economy has
insufficient capacity to absorb new migrant arrivals; and (4) the government faces severe resource
and capacity constraints in trying to deliver services to non-natives, as natives depend heavily on the
government for their economic well-being. Existing theories would suggest that Jordan is a context
in which egocentric and sociotropic economic concerns should drive attitudes toward migrants, and
the burden of hosting migrants should undercut humanitarian considerations. Moreover, as most
3 For example, IRI (2016) found that 61 percent of Jordanians believed that attitudes toward Syrians were getting
worse.
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Syrian refugees and native Jordanians share the same language, ethnicity, and religion, cultural
concerns should be less relevant as a determinant of public attitudes toward migrants than they are
in Western Europe and North America. A study of drivers of attitude formation in the Jordanian
context offers us the opportunity to explore the generality of the existing empirical consensus and
to identify factors that may condition attitudes in developing countries to a greater degree than in
developed contexts.
4 Research Design
4.1 Survey Sample
To deepen our understanding of attitude formation toward migrant populations in developing coun-
tries, we conducted a survey of the Jordanian public in February 2018. The survey was administered
by the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan to a nationally representative sample
of 1,200 Jordanians and an additional sample of 300 Jordanians living in areas of high refugee con-
centration.4 Respondents were recruited through a two-stage cluster sampling method, where 150
blocks were randomly selected across Jordan’s twelve governorates. Within each block, 8 house-
holds were selected using a random walk, providing a sample of 1,200.5 In addition, 30 of the
blocks were identified as being in the top quintile of refugee density, using data from UNHCR.
In these blocks, ten additional respondents were recruited for a sample of 300. CSS relied on the
2015 Jordan census to develop the sampling strategy and create post-stratification weights. The
response rate to the survey was 81.8%.6 We designed the questionnaire and sampling design with
input from two focus groups of young Jordanians, as well as more than 30 interviews with NGOs,
international organizations, and Jordanian government officials.7
4 The Center for Strategic Studies is a think tank at the University of Jordan that has extensive experience
implementing major academic surveys, including the Arab Barometer.
5 To ensure gender parity, half of enumerators recruited only men and half recruited only women, using the
birthday method within each household and gender.
6 CSS did not record non-responses for the first 4 days, but started recording them afterwards. The survey ran
from February 8, 2018 to March 9, 2018.
7 One focus group was conducted in Amman and one was conducted in Irbid. The focus groups were organized and
run by a female Jordanian journalist, with three of the authors in attendance. Discussion focused on perceptions
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4.2 Study Design
We leverage both an observational and experimental research design to explore attitudes toward
refugees in Jordan.
4.2.1 Observational Study
In the observational design, we regress attitudes on respondent characteristics to assesses the most
powerful predictors of Jordanians’ views of refugees. For outcomes, we measure three concepts:
First, we measure perceptions of Syrian refugees by asking respondents how they perceive relations
between Jordanians and Syrian refugees, whether they support hosting Syrian refugees, and a
feeling thermometer about Syrian refugees. Second, we measure perceptions of the impact of
Syrian refugees on Jordan by asking respondents whether the refugees made things better or worse
in the following areas: the economy, cultural life, the housing market, the quality of public services,
the quality of education, the level of crime, the threat of terrorism, Jordan’s image abroad, the
agriculture sector, and the overall situation. Third, we measure preferences on a set of refugee-
related policies by asking respondents whether they support four distinct policy measures: closing
the border to Syrian refugees, quarantining refugees in camps, sending all Syrian refugees back to
Syria, and providing work permits to Syrian refugees. For each of the three categories, we aggregate
the questions using principal components analysis to reduce measurement error and use the first
principal component as our main outcome of interest. The principal components are normalized
to have mean zero and a standard deviation of 1. The exact wording for all survey questions and
details of the principal components analysis are provided in the online appendix.
To capture the drivers of attitudes toward refugees, we measure a large set of respondent
characteristics that relate to the different theories of attitude formation toward refugees. We
then assess whether respondents with these characteristics demonstrate more negative or positive
attitudes toward Syrians as a test of the different theories’ relevance to attitude formation in Jordan.
Note that these hypotheses were not pre-registered and should be considered exploratory.
of and attitudes toward refugees. Recruits were Jordanian youths from diverse backgrounds, with a mix of
women and men.
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To identify respondents who should be more sensitive to egocentric economic concerns, we
measure income, education, and age. If egocentric economic concerns are an important driver of
Jordanians’ views toward refugees, we expect Jordanians with lower incomes and education levels,
as well as those who are younger, to exhibit higher levels of anti-refugee sentiment. As alluded to
previously, the majority of Syrians in Jordan work in low-paying occupations in the informal sector,
including as barbers, waiters, and agricultural and construction workers. Even those Syrians who
have obtained official work permits are relegated to these sectors in an effort to reduce competition
for more prestigious and higher-paying fields. As a result, lower-income, less-educated, and younger
Jordanians are more likely to be excluded from the workforce, or to experience downward pressure
on their wages, as a result of the refugee crisis (Stave & Hillesund, 2015). In addition, if egocentric
economic concerns are an important driver, we also expect Jordanians of Palestinian (West Bank)
descent, who make up a significant percentage of the population, to hold more negative perceptions
of the Syrian refugee population. This is because Jordanians of Palestinian descent tend to work in
the private sector, compared to Jordanians of East Bank descent who are more likely, on average,
to be employed by the government (Ryan, 2010). As a result, Jordanians of Palestinian descent
should be more exposed to economic competition with Syrian refugees. To measure West Bank
identity, we ask respondents which city their family is originally from and then we code this city
as part of the East or West Bank.
To capture exposure to sociotropic economic concerns at the community level within Jordan, we
measure geographic proximity to refugees based on the expectation that areas with large numbers of
refugees will be more sensitive to increased pressure on local public services like schools and water,
as well as rising rent prices (Zhao, 2018).8 If sociotropic economic concerns are an important driver
of Jordanians’ views toward refugees, we would therefore expect that respondents who reside in
areas with greater concentrations of refugees will express more negative perceptions of the Syrian
population. We measure proximity by asking about the frequency of contact with Syrian refugees
and using localized data on the density of refugees.
8 While greater humanitarian aid in these areas might offset these costs somewhat, the Jordanian government
claims that aid has not been enough to match the country’s needs (Husseini, 2018). As a result, it is likely that
communities with more refugees have faced higher pressure on the local economy because of the crisis.
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To capture intensity of cultural concerns, we code an index based on a battery of questions
asking respondents to indicate their tolerance of people from religious groups different than their
own. Specifically, respondents are asked about the extent of their concern that people from other
religious groups have different values and cultural practices than their own, are unappealing as
potential marriage partners, or contribute negatively to Jordan’s cultural and social diversity. Re-
spondents who score high on this index should be more sensitive to cultural threats, since it captures
their negativity toward out-group members across a salient cultural divide. Of course, culture is
inherently multidimensional, and religion is only one aspect of Jordanian culture; nonetheless, it is
an important one, and attitudes toward religious out-groups likely speak to more general antipathy
toward deviations from the country’s dominant culture.9 As a result, if cultural concerns are an
important driver of attitudes toward refugees in the Jordanian context, we expect that individuals
with higher scores on the index will hold more hostile perceptions of Syrian refugees.
Finally, we use three measures to capture sensitivity to humanitarian concerns. First, we
measure respondents’ religiosity by asking about the frequency of attending services at a mosque
or church. Albeit an imperfect measure, scholars have shown that religiosity relates to sensitivity
toward humanitarian need (Malka et al., 2011; Steenbergen, 2004). If humanitarian concerns are
an important driver of Jordanians’ attitudes, we expect that greater religiosity will correlate with
more positive perceptions of Syrian refugees. Second, Jordanians who have more frequent contact
with Syrian refugees may also be more attuned to their daily struggles, and therefore better able to
empathize with their humanitarian plight (Ghosn et al., 2019). We therefore expect that contact
will be associated with more positive perceptions of the refugee population if humanitarian concerns
are an important driver of Jordanians’ attitudes toward Syrian refugees. As mentioned above, we
measure contact through self-reporting and with data on the size of local refugee populations.
Third, research suggests that women are more attuned to humanitarianism (Steenbergen, 2004);
as a result, we expect that women will demonstrate more favorable attitudes toward refugees if
9 The overwhelming majority of Jordanians claim that religion is important in their lives and that they engage in
religious practices regularly (Williamson, 2019). The importance of religion in Jordanian culture is reinforced by
the state, which since its founding has regulated a large religious establishment including thousands of preachers,
mosques, charities, and other organizations. It is also reinforced by the regime, which seeks to promote its own
vision of Jordanian Islam (Robbins & Rubin, 2013).
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humanitarian concerns have contributed to the host population’s views on refugees.
Our core models also control for respondents’ general political knowledge and household size. In
addition, we control for exposure to one of three experimental treatments for a vignette experiment
whose results are reported elsewhere. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.10
4.2.2 Conjoint Experiment
In addition to the exploratory observational design, we implemented a randomized conjoint experi-
ment (Hainmueller et al., 2014) to identify the effects of refugees’ specific attributes on Jordanians’
willingness to host them. Hypotheses for the experiment were pre-registered with EGAP in De-
cember 2017, prior to the implementation of the survey.11
For the conjoint experiment, respondents were asked to compare pairs of hypothetical Syrian
refugee profiles. Each profile consisted of the following nine attributes: gender, age, occupation
in Syria, economic situation, current place of residence, education level, religious sect, reason for
fleeing Syria, and family status. The various levels associated with these attributes can be viewed
in Table 1, along with the instructions and questions accompanying the profiles. The levels were
fully randomized with the exception of two restrictions, intended to avoid particularly unrealistic or
confusing combinations: we did not allow the profiles to include a refugee who was 62-years old and
widowed with children, or a refugee with less than a university education who was an accountant
or engineer.
After viewing the profiles, respondents were first asked to rate each profile on a scale of 1 to 7
regarding whether Jordan should host the refugees and second to select which of the two profiles
they preferred Jordan to host. We pre-specified the latter forced choice as our primary outcome,
but results for the rating outcome are similar. Overall each respondent was asked to rate five
pairs yielding a total sample for the conjoint analysis of 15,000 refugee profiles. The order of the
attributes was randomized across respondents ,but fixed across tasks for the same respondent.
10 Jordan is divided into twelve governorates, and these governorates are divided into 51 districts known as liwa.
We clustered standard errors at this level.
11 Registration ID: 20180110AB.
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Attributes Values
Gender Male
Female
Age 21
38
62
Occupation in Syria Unemployed
Farmer
Barber
Accountant
Engineer
Economic Situation Relies on UNHCR benefits
Relies on Jordanian charities
Self-Sufficient
Current Place of Residence Zaatari Camp
Irbid
Education Level Primary
Secondary
Vocational
University
Religious Sect Sunni
Orthodox Christian
Alawite
Reason for Fleeing Political Persecution
Lack of Job Opportunities
Abandoned unit after fighting in the Syrian war
Violence Near Home
Family Status Single
Married without Children
Widowed without children
Widowed with children
Table 1: Attributes for the Conjoint Profiles of Syrian Refugees
The attributes defined for each refugee profile were designed to capture various theoretical
predictions, and we conducted focus groups after the survey to validate that Jordanians’ perceptions
of the attributes aligned with our use of them. First, if attitudes are driven by egocentric concerns
about job competition and personal economic interest, we expect that respondents should prefer
refugee profiles that do not share their own level of professional skill or education, as well as profiles
that are further from their own age (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2015). In addition, respondents
should prefer refugees living in Zaatari refugee camp, which is removed from areas of active labor
market activity, and they should penalize refugees coming from Syria primarily for greater job
opportunities.
Second, if sociotropic economic concerns shape attitudes toward refugees in Jordan, respondents
should prefer refugee profiles with higher levels of education and more skilled employment, since
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these refugees should be more likely to contribute to the economy (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2015).
Furthermore, respondents should prefer refugees with the resources to be self-sufficient, rather than
those relying on public assistance.
Third, to test the influence of cultural concerns on Jordanians’ attitudes toward the refugee
population, we again turn to religion as one salient marker of cultural identity and threat (Bennet,
1988; Campbell, 2006; Dunn et al., 2007; Kalkan et al., 2009). Refugee profiles were randomly
assigned to be Sunni Muslim, Alawite Muslim, or Orthodox Christian. Note that Sunni Muslims
are predominant in Jordan, but just under ten percent of the population is Christian. Alawite
Muslims constitute a sect usually associated with Shiite Islam that is prominent in Syria. Most
Syrian refugees in Jordan are Sunni, and the numbers of Christian and Alawite refugees are very
small in comparison.12 Nonetheless, if cultural threat is a concern that shapes attitudes toward
refugees, we would expect respondents to prefer Sunni Muslim profiles to Alawite and Christian
profiles because of their alignment with the country’s dominant religious identity.
Fourth, if humanitarian concerns contribute significantly to Jordanians’ attitudes surrounding
which refugees to host, respondents should prefer profiles that demonstrate heightened vulnerabil-
ities to conflict, including profiles that are identified as females, widows, the elderly, those with
children, and those dependent on UNHCR or Jordanian charities. While these attributes may not
be associated with perceived vulnerability in all circumstances, they reflect closely the characteris-
tics that international organizations and advocacy groups use to define vulnerability in migration
contexts (Hruschka & Leboeuf, 2019). For instance, the UNHCR Resettlement Handbook (2011)
discusses six vulnerable groups exposed to greater risk of harm as a result of migration, of which the
first three are “women and girls,” “children and adolescents,” and “older refugees.” This emphasis
occurs in other UNHCR sources as well (UNHCR, 2015, 2017). More generally, public opinion in
various contexts often appears to view women, children, and the elderly as groups deserving of spe-
cial protections (e.g. Eastmond & Ascher, 2011; Frey et al., 2010; Silverstein & Parrott, 1997). In
addition, to the extent that humanitarian concerns shape attitudes, respondents should prioritize
12 As of 2014, an estimated 20,000 Syrian Christians had entered Jordan (Glatz, 2014). The number of Alawite
refugees is likely minuscule, in part because Alawites have been more closely tied to the Assad regime and less
likely to flee Syria as a result.
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Syrians who have a legitimate claim to refugee status – i.e. those fleeing persecution and violence,
as opposed to Syrians escaping a lack of job opportunities or abandoning their unit after fighting
in the war.
Table 2 provides an overview of the hypotheses for both the observational analysis and the
conjoint experiment. The table also outlines our earlier discussion of existing findings on attitudes
toward migrants in Western contexts, as well as our broader expectations about the role of economic,
cultural, and humanitarian concerns in the Jordanian context.
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5 Results
5.1 Results of Observational Study
Figure 3 shows the estimated marginal effects from the regressions of the three measures of per-
ceptions of Syrian refugees on the respondent characteristics.13 Positive coefficients indicate more
positive attitudes, less negative perceptions of impact, and stronger pro-refugee policy positions.
The findings support hypotheses about the role of humanitarianism and cultural threat in shap-
ing attitudes, and they provide almost no support for hypotheses about the role of egocentric or
sociotropic economic threat.
Regarding egocentric economic concerns, income shows no consistent relationship with the three
outcome variables. And when there is a significant relationship, the effect size is small. Younger
Jordanians, who should be more likely to experience economic competition with Syrians, are if
anything more positively inclined toward the refugee population (younger people are slightly more
positive about the impact of refugees). Likewise, Jordanians of West Bank origin are more likely to
hold positive views on all three outcome measures. This pattern runs contrary to our expectations
about the importance of egocentric economic threat, since West Bank Jordanians are less likely
to be employed by the government and should be more exposed to economic competition with
Syrians. Only the education variable aligns with our hypothesis in favor of the egocentric economic
threat argument, as higher educational attainment is weakly correlated with more positive views
of refugees. A one-level increase in education, such as from completing high school to completing
university, is associated with up to 0.09 standard deviation (95% C.I.= 0.03 - 0.14) increase in the
attitudes measure, representing less than one-tenth of a standard deviation. This finding might
also be attributable to higher levels of tolerance among more educated respondents (Hainmueller
& Hopkins, 2014).
Hypotheses related to the importance of sociotropic economic threat in shaping attitudes also
find little support. The measures of contact intended to proxy for sociotropic impact do not
indicate that greater pressure on one’s community as a result of the refugee crisis is associated with
13 Figure A.1 in the online appendix shows the results using an additive index for each outcome.
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Figure 3: Relationship between respondent characteristics and views of refugees.
Note: Coefficient plots from a multiple regression of the first principal components of the
attitudes, impact, and policy outcomes on the respondent characteristics. Regressions also controls
for exposure to one of three experimental treatments for a vignette experiment (not reported here).
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more negative attitudes toward refugees. If anything, these proxy measures are correlated with
more positive views of Syrian refugees. More frequent self-reported contact is associated with more
positive attitudes and policy positions, and higher numbers of refugees in the respondents’ district is
also associated with greater support for pro-refugee policies. These patterns are consistent instead
with our hypotheses about the importance of humanitarian concerns. Also consistent with the
relevance of humanitarianism, greater religiosity is weakly correlated with more positive attitudes
and less negative impact assessments, and women are less likely to perceive the impact of refugees
as negative, and more likely to oppose policies that would harm refugees.
Finally, a higher score on the cultural threat index—indicating greater sensitivity to differ-
ences between oneself and other religious groups—is strongly correlated with negativity toward
the refugee population on all three outcome measures. This finding suggests that, in spite of the
relative similarity between the host and refugee communities in Jordan, cultural concerns remain
an important factor in shaping Jordanians’ attitudes toward Syrian refugees. An increase in the
cultural threat index by one standard deviations is associated with as much as −0.19 standard
deviation (95% C.I.= −0.27 - −0.11) change in the outcome measures.
5.2 Results of Conjoint Experiment
We follow the standard approach for analyzing randomized conjoint experiments, using OLS regres-
sions with standard errors clustered by respondent to estimate the Average Marginal Component
Effect (AMCE) for each attribute. Note that the AMCE represents the marginal effect of an at-
tribute averaged over the joint distribution of the remaining attributes (Hainmueller et al., 2014).
Figure 4 displays the AMCE for the forced choice and the rating outcomes. Each dot represents the
AMCE on the probability that respondents chose to host the Syrian refugee in Jordan; the unfilled
circles are the reference categories and the horizontal lines are robust 95% confidence intervals.
The results from the conjoint experiment are consistent with the observational analysis in
showing that humanitarian and cultural concerns, rather than egocentric or sociotropic economic
threats, play the strongest role in shaping attitudes toward the refugee community in Jordan.
Religious sect had by far the largest impact on respondents’ preferences: In the forced choice
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Figure 4: Main results from the conjoint experiment.
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outcome, Alawite Muslims were 34 percentage points (95% C.I.= 0.32 - 0.36) and Christians were
15 percentage points (95% C.I.= 0.12 - 0.17) less likely to be preferred by respondents compared
to Sunni refugees. The next largest effects were for men, who were penalized by 9 percentage
points (95% C.I.= 0.07 - 0.11) as compared to women, and for families with children, who were 10
percentage points (95% C.I.= 0.06 - 0.13) more likely to have been chosen when the parent was
widowed and 7 percentage points (95% C.I.= 0.04 - 0.09) more likely to be chosen when the parent
was still married.
Engineers received a boost of 5 percentage points (95% C.I.= 0.02 - 0.10) as compared to
the unemployed, while barbers 3 percentage points (95% C.I.= 0.00 - 0.05) and farmers were 4
percentage points (95% C.I.= 0.01 - 0.06) more likely to be chosen, respectively. The oldest refugee
profiles were 3 percentage points (95% C.I.= 0.00 - 0.05) more likely to be selected, and refugees
said to be fleeing Syria for job opportunities were 3 percentage points (95% C.I.= 0.00 - 0.05) less
likely to have been selected. Finally, refugees relying on UNHCR benefits were penalized by 2
percentage points (95% C.I.= 0.00 - 0.05) and those receiving benefits by Jordanian charities were
penalized by 4 percentage points (95% C.I.= 0.02 - 0.06) percentage points. Other attribute levels
were statistically insignificant. The results from the rating outcome are substantively similar to
those from the forced choice outcome.
Interaction terms provide little support for the hypothesis that egocentric economic concerns
play a significant role in shaping Jordanians’ attitudes toward the refugee population. Figure 5
and Figure 6 present evidence that the AMCEs do not differ for respondents who are more likely
to be in competition for jobs with refugees, including those who are unemployed and those with
less than college education. Neither of these groups are noticeably more likely to select refugees
with skill levels and vocations that would present less as compared to more job competition. In
addition, the AMCEs also do not differ noticeably by respondent age.14 Furthermore, the main
effects also provide little support for the importance of egocentric concerns. While the significant
negative effect for the job level is consistent with this hypothesis, the non-effect on Zaatari camp
is not.
14 See Figure A.7 in the appendix.
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The results provide only weak support for the hypothesis that sociotropic economic concerns
shape Jordanians’ attitudes toward refugees, particularly when compared to stronger findings in the
literature from Western countries. The fact that respondents prefer self-reliant refugees provides
some support for this hypothesis, as does the fact that engineers, barbers, and farmers received
a statistically significant advantage over Syrians who had been unemployed prior to arriving in
Jordan. However, these effect sizes are relatively small, and it is notable that neither engineers nor
accountants are more likely to be selected by respondents than refugees coming from lower-skilled
occupations. Furthermore, the refugee’s education level had no effect on Jordanians’ preferences.
These education null effects contrast with several previous studies in the United States and Europe
showing that migrants with higher levels of education are preferred by host community members
(Bansak et al., 2016; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2010).
The particularly sizable effects for the religious attributes provide support for the hypothesis
that Jordanians are wary of potential cultural differences with refugees arriving to the country, and
that they are much less likely to welcome those refugees who appear to fall outside the country’s
cultural mainstream. The vast majority of Syrian refugees in Jordan are Sunni, and the negative
effects for Alawites and Christians provide strong evidence that the Jordanian public considers this
alignment with the host culture to be important. To bolster this interpretation, we also divided our
sample into more and less religious respondents, and examined subgroup effects for the religious
attributes among these two groups. In both cases, the penalty for Alawite and Christian Syrians is
substantively similar, suggesting that religious identity serves as an important marker of Jordanian
culture even among non-religious Sunni Jordanians. This hostility to cultural differences aligns with
other research from Western contexts indicating that prejudice and xenophobia toward perceived
out-groups often underlies opposition to migration (Dustmann & Preston, 2007; Sniderman et al.,
2004).
The results also provide evidence for the importance of humanitarian concerns. Following
religious identity, gender and children demonstrate the next largest effect sizes, which suggests that
respondents prioritize hosting the most vulnerable refugees. This finding is in line with similar
results derived from European populations (Bansak et al., 2016). Age also produced a statistically
significant effect, with elderly refugees being more likely to be selected. Furthermore, while refugees
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fleeing persecution and violence were not more likely to be selected than refugees abandoning their
unit in the civil war, they were more likely to be selected than refugees fleeing for better employment
opportunities.15 Only the benefits attribute did not offer support for the humanitarian hypothesis,
since respondents were more likely to select self-reliant refugees over those dependent on UNHCR
or local charities.16
5.2.1 Evidence from Focus Groups
One potential issue with the experimental design is that respondents may interpret the attributes
differently than the researchers. For instance, the strongly negative Alawite effect may reflect dislike
of the Assad regime in Syria rather than concerns about cultural differences with Jordanians. To
assess the extent to which respondents’ interpretations aligned with our hypotheses, we conducted
two focus groups with new groups of Jordanians following the implementation of the survey, one
in May 2018 and another in July 2018. As part of the focus group, participants answered the
same conjoint questions individually and discussed their reasons for doing so with the group. The
discussions were managed by a female Jordanian facilitator with previous experience conducting
focus groups. The focus groups were arranged by the Center for Strategic Studies at the University
of Jordan and hosted by local charities in two lower/middle class neighborhoods of Amman.17
In both focus groups, participants’ interpretations of the categories generally reflected the
researchers’ understanding. Regarding age, gender, and family status, humanitarian concerns
15 While refugees who abandoned their unit may not be clearly deserving of refugee status, it remains the case that
they were described as fleeing from violence, which may explain the lack of an effect relative to the “political
persecution” and “violence near home” values.
16 It should be noted, however, that many Jordanians believe refugees who receive benefits also work and sometimes
sell the benefits, and so these refugees may in fact be perceived to be better off. As a result, this attribute is
not our most effective test of the humanitarian hypothesis.
17 Respondents were recruited by the charities through their contacts in the community. They were paid a small
incentive for their participation and transportation costs. The first focus group included 8 women and 4 men.
The women included a mix of students, housewives, and others, while employment for the men ranged from a
taxi driver to a government employee in the Jordan Monetary Authority. The second focus group included 8
women and 3 men. The women included a mix of teachers and housewives, and the men included two engineers
and a student.
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Figure 5: Conjoint results by respondent education.
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were predominant. One participant said she preferred to host females because “they are the
most...exposed to violence” (Female 1 in Focus Group 1, 2018) while another preferred to host
older refugees because “it is difficult for the elderly to stay in [Syria]” (Female 4 in Focus Group
1, 2018). Several participants appeared to prioritize refugees who had children, explaining that
children have “the right to live” (Female 3 in Focus Group 1, 2018) and are “innocent...from a
humanitarian perspective” (Male 2 in Focus Group 1, 2018). Another noted that “kids don’t have
people to look after them” (Female 7 in Focus Group 2, 2018) and one simply stated “humanity”
when asked why they favored children and widows (Female 4 in Focus Group 2, 2018). When
participants were later shown the survey results and asked to explain why family considerations
mattered in the conjoint, they emphasized “the emotions of the Jordanians” (Male 6 in Focus
Group 1, 2018) and “Jordanian magnanimity” (Male 1 in Focus Group 1, 2018).
Participants who brought up religious sect expressed concerns about bringing new sects into the
country, particularly Alawites, due to the potential for unwanted cultural transmission. As stated by
one participant, “Jordan has only two religions, [Sunni Islam and Christianity], so there is no need
to bring in any other doctrines” (Male 3 in Focus Group 1, 2018). Participants worried explicitly
about Alawites influencing the ideas of Jordanian children, noting that they “may influence our
kids’...beliefs when they are mixed with them” (Female 4 in Focus Group 2, 2018) and that they
“have thoughts they may spread, kids can absorb any idea” (Male 2 in Focus Group 2, 2018). One
participant described a situation in which her daughter had allegedly become confused about how
to pray because of interactions with an Alawite Syrian refugee at school (Female 3 in Focus Group
2, 2018). This woman held the view that “everyone” in Jordan shares her dislike of Alawites “for
the very simple reason that they don’t share the same religion as we do.”
On the other hand, Christians were viewed as less culturally distinct from the Sunni majority.
One participant stated that Christians are “a bit better than the Alawite” because, “there’s only
a slight difference between Muslims and Christians” (Female 2 in Focus Group 2, 2018). Another
participant emphasized that “we live with Christians and they are just fine” (Female 4 in Focus
Group 2, 2018). This difference, according to one participant, occurs because “Christians are
people of the book [like Sunni Muslims], but the Alawite is a Shiite” (Male 3 in Focus Group 2,
2018). This same participant went on to express negative views of how Alawites were transmitting
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dangerous cultural practices and beliefs, claiming that Alawites “brought temporary marriage [and]
persecuted women. They have totally different religious concepts than we do, a different Quran,
different prophets” (Male 3 in Focus Group 2, 2018).18
When education was mentioned, it typically reflected sociotropic economic concerns, as when
one participant said he preferred more highly educated individuals “to cover the country’s economic
and academic needs” (Male 4 in Focus Group 1, 2018). Another participant stated that “an illiterate
person whom I have to feed and educate...becomes a burden,” whereas, “when he’s educated, he
can go to any job” (Female 7 in Focus Group 2, 2018). Likewise, a participant referenced the
policies of Western countries for their emphasis on high-skilled immigrants, noting that “Educated
people help raise the economy of the country...the United States and Europe took educated people.
Why?” (Male 2 in Focus Group 2, 2018). Finally, when it came to reason for fleeing, participants
emphasized both humanitarian and security concerns, noting both the importance of protecting
refugees from persecution, but also that “we don’t need troublemakers” (Female 3 in Focus Group
1, 2018). These discussions strengthen our confidence in the validity of the conjoint attributes as
measures with relevance to our hypotheses about economic, cultural, and humanitarian concerns.
6 Discussion
Objectively, there is little doubt that the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on Jordan has been
significant. In the span of a few years, Jordan’s population increased by nearly ten percent, in large
part due to refugee inflows. This rapid increase exacerbated the country’s pre-existing economic
problems, including high unemployment, inadequate infrastructure, overburdened public services,
and a deeply indebted government. With the exception of Lebanon and perhaps Turkey, no other
country has been subject to so much strain as a result of the current refugee crisis. This experience
is markedly different than in the West, where the number of refugees is relatively small in both
18 Anti-Shiite prejudices in Jordan are often encouraged by conservative religious groups for whom hostility toward
Shiism is an important component of their ideology. They have also been bolstered by the regime: King Abdullah
controversially labeled Shiite countries and organizations as a “Shia crescent” threatening the region, and the
regime has remained fearful of Shiite political actors (Wagemakers, 2016).
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aggregate and proportional terms, and where economies also possess significantly more capacity to
absorb refugees.
Jordan therefore provides a useful test that allows us to fill a gap in the existing literature:
namely, the lack of studies on attitude formation toward migrant populations in developing contexts,
which have been most affected by the current refugee crisis. Specifically, we use the Jordanian
context to test existing theories about the importance of egocentric and sociotropic economic threats
in shaping attitudes toward migrant populations. In contrast to findings from Western contexts, our
study finds little evidence that egocentric or sociotropic economic concerns contribute substantially
to Jordanians’ views of Syrian refugees. Instead, we show evidence consistent with the importance
of humanitarian and cultural factors. Jordanians with greater first-hand exposure to refugees and
less sensitivity to cultural differences between themselves and others exhibited more positive views
of Syrian refugees, and Jordanians across the board were more likely to prefer hosting refugees who
were both vulnerable from a humanitarian standpoint and culturally similar to the host community.
The importance of these humanitarian and cultural factors suggests that, in the aggregate,
Jordanian attitudes toward Syrians should be relatively positive, despite the significant economic
impact of the refugee crisis on Jordan. After all, there is little question that Syrians have suffered
greatly, and cultural differences between Jordanians and Syrians are minimal compared to many
host and refugee populations elsewhere in the world. We argue that this pattern is visible in our
top-line survey results. As shown in Figure 7, the overwhelming majority of respondents rate
Syrians positively on the feeling thermometer and say that relations between the host and refugee
communities are strong, suggesting little outright prejudice against the refugees. A majority of
respondents also continue to endorse their country supporting and assisting Syrians, and majorities
do not support closing the border to refugees or forcing those in Jordan to return to Syria. Majorities
do want the government to move refugees to camps and to refrain from providing all refugees with
work permits, suggesting opposition to integration. Furthermore, large majorities also believe that
the impact of the refugee crisis on their country has been negative—particularly with regards to the
economy and public services. Yet, these negative impact assessments may reflect a justifiable – and
arguably accurate – perception of the effects of the refugee crisis on Jordan. The fact that many
respondents articulate these negative opinions on impact while still describing refugees favorably
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and supporting efforts to assist them suggests that attitudes toward refugees remain relatively
positive among the Jordanian public.
Our claim that Jordanians’ attitudes toward Syrians remain relatively positive – particularly
given the magnitude of the crisis – is reinforced through a comparison to public opinion in the
United States and Europe at the height of the Syrian refugee crisis. While American and European
attitudes toward migrants are often positive in the abstract (Rasmussen & Poushter, 2019)—and
have become more favorable since the peak of the refugee crisis in 2015—attitudes toward Syrians
in particular were generally negative. In 2015 and 2016, several surveys indicated that a majority of
Americans did not want the United States to accept any refugees from Syria at all (Desilver, 2015;
Kaplan, 2015; Smeltz et al., 2016). These attitudes were expressed at a time when the United
States was admitting fewer than 100,000 refugees from all countries in a given year. In 2017,
more than 80 percent of Americans identified Syrian and Iraqi refugees as a threat to the United
States (Smith, 2017), and in Europe in 2016, majorities in Poland, Greece, Hungary, Italy, and the
United Kingdom claimed that refugees from these countries were a “major” threat (Poushter, 2016).
These attitudes contrast with attitudes in our survey described above, including the majority of
Jordanians who did not support closing the border to refugees and supported ongoing efforts to
host and assist Syrians, in addition to the large majority who expressed positive attitudes toward
Syrian refugees on the feeling thermometer.
As a more systematic comparison of Jordanians’ attitudes toward refugees to the attitudes of
those in the West, we compare our conjoint results to a replication of findings from Bansak et al.,
(2016), who implement a similar conjoint design to study Europeans’ views of asylum seekers at the
peak of the refugee crisis. In their study, they plot the percentage of asylum seeker profiles accepted
across the 15 European countries in their sample. We repeat this exercise in Jordan, showing that
our respondents supported hosting – rather than removing – approximately 50 percent of Syrian
refugee profiles. As shown in the Appendix, this percentage is higher than 13 of the 15 European
countries studied in Bansak et al., with the exceptions of Italy and Spain. This comparison is not
perfect: the conjoint attributes are similar but not identical across the two studies. Nonetheless,
this pattern suggests that Jordanians in our survey remained more willing to entertain the idea of
admitting refugees than many of their European counterparts, despite the heavier burden of the
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Figure 7: Attitudes toward refugees across outcome questions.
Note: This plot shows the percent of respondents whose answers indicated negativity toward
refugees.
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Syrian refugee crisis on Jordan than any European country.
The importance of humanitarian and cultural factors in our study, in addition to the rela-
tively positive attitudes of Jordanians toward Syrian refugees, suggest that humanitarian concerns
can outweigh significant economic repercussions and sustain support for migrant populations, but
primarily in contexts where cultures are similar. If many more of the refugees were Alawite or
Christian, or perhaps if they were non-Arabs, attitudes toward the refugees would likely be more
negative. Instead, they appear to have remained relatively positive because the shared cultural
ties between Jordanians and Syrians helps humanitarian concerns to persist. This dynamic was
articulated in our post-survey focus group discussions. One participant reflected on the entry of a
low-skilled Syrian refugee used to working as a dustman, suggesting that the need to preserve his
dignity outweighed the lack of economic benefit he would bring to Jordan. He asked, “Are we going
to send him back because he’s a scavenger?” He then noted that “...if the person is persecuted,
we needn’t add insult to injury. These people have to be received and have their dignity kept...we
aren’t to receive them because they are literate or not” (Male 2 in Focus Group 2, 2018). Another
participant spoke similarly, observing how Jordanians “cared about the widows and children and
forgot our problems, such as overcrowding and difficult financial conditions” (Female 1 in Focus
Group 1, 2018).
Others succinctly summarized how cultural similarity facilitated this outcome. One stressed
that “Jordan, Palestine, and Syria are all countries that share similar roots and characteristics
which we received from our ancestors. Even if we want to be selfish, we cannot, because this is
something deep inside us that we cannot help” (Female 5 in Focus Group 2, 2018). Likewise, a
participant emphasized “the shared history among us,” noting that “We’re Muslims and we can’t let
them [Syrians] down” (Male 5 in Focus Group 2, 2018). A second participant responded positively
to this comment, saying “Thank God we’re born this way. We feel for others. And if a guest comes,
we will be generous to them” (Female 6 in Focus Group 2, 2018).
At one point in the second focus group, respondents were asked explicitly to confront the appar-
ent contradiction between a negative assessment of the refugees’ impact on Jordan—particularly
with regards to prices, housing, and jobs—and a continued willingness to describe Syrians favorably
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and welcome them into the country. One participant responded first that “there is no other place
they [Syrians] can resort to. They are our brothers. We are required to take them in” (Female 2
in Focus Group 2, 2018). Another participant claimed that “...we can open the borders for them
because this country is to serve them.” He then followed up by noting that “We receive families
who are Sunni. The others who are Shiite, we don’t receive them. They are the source of trouble”
(Male 3 in Focus Group 2, 2018). When someone responded to him by noting that Syrian Sunnis
also raised prices, he countered by saying “Forget about the problems...among them [Syrians] are
kids, elders, and women,” and that “They can come in, even if I don’t have enough to eat and my
girls don’t have enough to eat...I, as a Muslim, am obliged to open the door for my brother” (Male 3
in Focus Group 2, 2018). When two respondents then defended closing the border to new refugees,
they were told that “If they [refugees] are women and kids, we should let them in, it’s not fair to
close the border on them” (Female 8 in Focus Group 2, 2018), that “We should let them in because
above all they are humans” (Female 7 in Focus Group 2, 2018), and that “We really need to receive
them even if they have a negative effect on us” (Female 5 in Focus Group 2). These conversations
illustrate how the combination of humanitarian concerns and cultural similarity appears to have
sustained a meaningful level of support for the refugees in the face of economic difficulties.
Lebanon provides an important counterexample that further reinforces this interpretation of our
findings. Like Jordan, Lebanon has borne a significant burden as a result of the Syrian refugee crisis,
but unlike Jordan, Lebanon is sharply divided between its Sunni, Shia, and Christian citizens. The
influx of Syrian refugees has threatened to upend the fragile balance between these groups (Betts
et al., 2017; Hagerdal, 2018). In the context of our findings, this greater cultural threat suggests
that attitudes toward Syrian refugees should be more negative than those in Jordan. A number of
sources support this expectation: in Lebanon, public attitudes toward refugees are more hostile,
government policies are less generous, and politicians have actively incited negativity toward the
Syrian population (Francis, 2017; Hagerdal, 2018).
One alternative explanation for our findings is that attitudes reflected in our survey are the
result of Jordan’s authoritarian political system, whereby Jordanians emphasized humanitarian
concerns and minimized their expressions of hostile sentiments to avoid articulating opinions that
might upset the government’s narrative. This explanation is unlikely for several reasons. First,
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the Jordanian government has presented a narrative to the international community in which their
hands are tied by a public frustrated with the refugees’ presence; our survey results therefore do
not clearly serve the government’s interests. Second, Jordanians have a long history of contesting
unpopular government policies, as demonstrated by protests against a proposed tax bill in May
and June 2018 that resulted in the resignation of Prime Minister Hani Mulki. It is also not the case
that economically vulnerable Jordanians are significantly less likely to articulate political views; in
fact, protests during the Arab Spring were often driven by impoverished and marginalized rural
communities (Yom, 2014). As a result, we do not think that the muted economic effects were
driven by a general reluctance to express criticism, or greater reluctance among Jordanians most
affected by the refugees’ economic impact personally and in their communities. Finally, we included
a battery of questions in the survey to measure respondents’ sensitivity to social desirability bias. If
concerns about respecting a pro-government narrative were salient to survey respondents, we would
expect individuals more susceptible to social desirability bias to be particularly careful about their
responses. However, we do not find meaningful differences between these subgroups (see Figure
A.2 in the online appendix).
7 Conclusion
Our findings provide quantitative evidence on the factors that drive attitude formation toward
migrant populations in a non-Western context, and as such have theoretical implications for the
literature on this topic. As shown in Table 3, our findings reinforce the relevance of some existing
theories while demonstrating limitations to others. First, given the impact of the refugee crisis on
Jordan and its economy, the study provides evidence against theories emphasizing the importance of
egocentric economic concerns as a major driver of anti-migrant sentiment. In particular, our results
support a growing view that there is little evidence of egocentric concerns, even in a critical case
where refugee inflows have a had major impact on the host country economy. Second, the results
also call into question an emerging consensus on the relevance of sociotropic economic concerns.
The absence of substantial effects in this regard is especially surprising, given the significant impact
of the refugee crisis on Jordan and the large effects found in Western countries. These disparities
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point to a need for future research to examine when and why sociotropic economic concerns become
influential in shaping attitudes toward migrant populations. The disparities also underscore the
importance of paying close attention to issues of sample bias in published work and the need for
research in additional unexplored contexts.
Theory Description Findings In Findings in
the West Jordan
Egocentric Fears of labor market Mixed No
Economic competition and other Support Support
Concerns personal economic threats
are a main driver of
attitudes toward migrants
Sociotropic Perceived threats to Strong Weak
Economic country’s economy and Support Support
Concerns services are a main
driver of attitudes
toward migrants
Cultural Perceived threats to Strong Strong
Concerns country’s culture Support Support
by cultural out-group
are a main driver of
attitudes toward migrants
Humanitarian Sensitivity to Mixed Strong
Concerns humanitarian Support Support
concerns is a main
driver of attitudes
toward migrants
Table 3: Theories of Attitudes toward Migrants and Findings in Jordan
Secondly, our results bolster existing theories about the importance of perceived cultural threat
in influencing attitudes toward migrant populations. On the one hand, the findings illustrate how
sensitivity to cultural differences with migrants can generate negativity among the host population
even in contexts where these differences are relatively slight. On the other hand, the findings also
suggest that severe public backlash against migrants will be less likely to occur when migration
takes place from countries in which cultural differences are less pronounced.
Lastly, our findings related to humanitarian concerns support a growing focus in the literature
on the importance of humanitarianism in fostering sympathy for refugee and other migrant popu-
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lations. Practically, these results suggest that actors interested in promoting or maintaining social
cohesion between host and refugee communities should explain and communicate the humanitar-
ian plight of refugees, as well as their cultural similarity to the host community when applicable.
Helping host communities around the world understand the extensive needs of refugee populations
and reducing ignorance about different cultural practices may be viable strategies for shaping more
positive public opinion toward migrant populations. With anti-refugee sentiment on the rise and no
end in sight to the current migration crisis, exploring such an approach to building social cohesion
is a promising area for future research.
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